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cause of the accident." The language used by the
its comments was unfortunate, but since the law was clear
and correctly stated in the instruction and the ju
was
roximate
accurately instructed elsewhere on the subject 0
cause and contributory lwg-ligencp, we are
Isfi!'d that no
miscarriage of justice resu]t!:'d. (Cal.Con ., art. VI, § 4 th.)
Thr other claims of !:'rror made b' efendlmts are wholly
without m!:')'it and n!:'rd not be d'
Thr jlld,:rnJ!:'J1t is affirmrd.
Sh!:'nk, J., Edmo s, .1., Cartrr, .1., TrarlloJ' .•T., Schaner,
., concurred.

.J., and Spence

[L. A. Ko. 22418.

In Bank.

Oct. 31, 1952.]

ROBERT J. KEIDATZ et al., Appellants, v. LOUIS J.
ALBANY et al., Respondents.
[lJ Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judgment entered after sustaining a general demurrer is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the
facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will,
accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same
facts.
[2J ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-Even though
different facts may be alleged in a second action, if a general
demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally
applicable to the second, the former judgment on such demurrer will be a bar to the second action.
[SJ ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If new or additional facts are alleged in a second action which cure defects
in the original pleading, the former judgment on a general
demurrer is not a bar to the subsequent action, whether or
not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint.
[4] ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judgment entered on demurrer in action by purchasers against vendors of
realty for rescission of contract of sale is not res judicata
in subsequent action by purchasers for damages for fraudulent
representations of such vendors, where the complaint in the
first action did not allege that the property was worth less

[1] Conclusiveness of judgment 011 demurrer, notes, 13 A.L.R.
1104; 106 A.L.R. 437. See, also, Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 184; Am.
Jur., Pleading, § 251 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-5] Judgments, § 352.
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than the price agreed to be paid therefor (Civ. Code, § 3343),
and hence did not state a cause of action for damages for fraud.
[5] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-Although a judgment in rescission action following a full trial on the merits
is res judicata not only as to issues actually raised, but also
as to issues that could have been raised in support of the
action, a judgment entered on demurrer does not have such
broad res judicata effect.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura County. \\Talter J. Fourt, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages resulting from fraudulent representations in connection with sale of realty. Judgment for defendants reversed.
D. Wendell Reid for Appellants.
"William T. Selby for Respondents.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-In this action to recover damages for fraud,
plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to buy a newlyconstructed home from defendants by certain false and fraudulent representations respecting the character of the construction of the house and its location on the described real property. They further alleged that the representations were
known by defendants to be false and were made to induce
plaintiffs to purchase the property and that the contract price
of $6,500 exceeded the value of the property by $3,000. In
their answer defendants denied the allegations of fraud and
pleaded affirmatively that plaintiffs' action was barred by two
former adjudications between the parties. Defendants then
made a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits
setting out the following undisputed facts: in 1949, plaintiffs
brought an action to rescind the contract for fraud and failure
of consideration. A demurrer to the second amended complaint was sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to
amend within the time allowed, and judgment was entered
for defendants for costs. Thereafter plaintiffs unsuccessfully
sought relief from the judgment under section 473 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. No appeal was taken, however, from
the judgment or from the order denying relief under section
473. Approximately four months after the judgment in the
rescission action was entered, plaintiffs brought this action for
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damages for fraud. 'fhe trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs have appealed.
Plaintiffs contend that their unsuccessful attempt to secure
rescission of the. contract does not bar their present action
for damal!('s for fraud. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that th<> former judgment is res judicata of all issues
presentpd here.f.· Since tlle former judgment was entered after
a general demurrer had been sustained with leave to amend,
it is necessary to determine the scope of the doctrine of res
judicata in sueh circumstances. [1] The procedural effect
of such a judgment appears to be sui getter-is. It is a judgment
011 the llJerits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts
IIlleg!'d du not constitute a eallse of action, and will, accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the .same facts.
(See Y. Joughin, 18 Ca1.2d 603, 606-609 [116 P.2d 777];
Godilard Y. Sec-llrity Title Ins. &- GlIar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47, 52
[92 P.2d 804] ; Fay Y. C"ags Lamd Co., 62 Cal.App.2d 445,
448 (145 P.2d 46].) [2] Moreover, even though different
facts ma~' be alleged in the second aetion, if the demurrer was
sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable
to the seeond, the former judgment will also be a bar. (Robinson Y. Howat'd, :> Cal. 428, 429; Goddard v. Seourity Title
Ins. d' Guar. Co., .~lIpra.) [3] If, on the other hand, new
or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the
orig-inal pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is
110t a bar to the subsequent actjon whether or not plaintiff
had an opportunity to amend his complaint. (Goddard v.
Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., Sllpra.; Ncwh.all v. Hatch, 134
Cal. 269, 272 [66 P. 266, 55 L.R.A. 673] ; Heilig v. Parlin, 134
Cal. 99, 101-102 [66 P. 18] ; Morrell v. Morgan, 65 Cal. 575, 576577 [4 P. 580] ; City of Los Angeles v. Mellus, 59 Cal. 444, 453;
Rose v. Ames, 68 Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [156 P.2d 953] ; Dynz.ent
Y. Board of Me.dic.al Exarl/lin·ers, 93 Cal.App. 65, 71 [268 P.
1073] ; Takekawa. v. Hol.e, 17 Cal.App. 653,656 [121 P. 296];
see See Y. JOllghin, 18 Cal.2d 603, 606 [116 P.2d 777] ; CampCT/ella v. Campenclla, 204 Cal. 515. 521 [269 P. 433] ; Erganian
Y. Brightman, 13 Cal.App.2d 696, 700 (57 P.2d 971]; Re• After plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to rescind the contract, but
before the present action was commenced, defendants purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale under the deed of trust given to lIecure
the purchase price, and recovered judgment by defa.ult for possession
of the property. Defendants make no argument on this appeal, how·
ever, that the summary judgment may be sustained on the basis of
theBe faets.
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statf'ment, Judgments, § 50, Comments c and e; 30 Cal.L.Rev.
487; Anno., 106 A.L.R. 437, 444.)
[4] In plaintiffs' first action they sought rescission of the
contrad. In addition to alleging certain fraudulent representatiOll>; wh('reby the~' were induceu to enter into the contract,
they alleged that the:' had offered to restore everything of
yalue they hall rpceiYf'd, and sought the return of the payment.s they had madl'. It appeared from the complaint, however, that the alleged defects in construction became apparent
to plaintiffs over a year before they sought to rescind, and
defendants successfully demurred on the ground that the
action was barred by laches and by failure to rescind promptly.
(See Civ. Code, § ]69]; Williams v. lIfn,rshall, 37 Cal.2d 445,
455-456 [235 P .2d 372].) Whether or not the complaint
st.ates a cause of action for rescission, the demurrer should
have been overruled if a cause of action for damages
was statf'd. (Banc1'oft Y. Woodward, ]83 Cal. 99, 102 [190 P.
44;1]; lIlacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809, 815 [161 P.2d 449].)
Plaintiffs' complaint did not, llOwever, allege that the property was worth less than the price they agreed to pay
for it (Civ. Code, § 3343), and accordingly, it did not state
a rause of action for damag-es for fraud. (Davis v. Rite-Lite
Sales Co .. 8 Cal.2d 675, 679 [67 P.2d 1039] ; G'utterman v.
Golly, 13] Cal.App. 647, 65]-652 [21 P.2d 1000].) In the
present artion, plaintiffs haw added this allegation that was
absent from their fo1'111rr complaint, and accordingl:" under
thf' rule hereinabove stated, the former judgment is not a
bar to this action.
[5] Deff'ndants contend however, that Wulfjen v. Dolton,
24 Cal.2d 891 [15] P.2d 846], establishes the rule that a party
rlaiming- to have been defrauded must seek all the relief
to which he may be entitled in one action, and that he may
not. after having failed in an action to rescind a contract
for fraud, thereaftpr bring a spcond action for damages. In
the Wnlfjen case. however, the judgment in the rescission
at'tiOll had not been entered on demurrer, but had followed a
full trial on thf' mprits. and the court applied the rule that
such a judgment is res judicata not only as to issues actually
raised, but as to issues that could have bepn raised in support
of the action. (See Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d ] 95, 202 [99
P.2d 6;)2, ]01 P.2d 497].) As has beE'n pointed out above.
howrwr, it has bepn tIl{' settled rule in this state that a judg-lJlf'llt entered on demurrpr does not have snch broad res
judirllta effect. The rule respecting snch judgments is iUus-

830

KEIDATZ

v.

ALBANY

[39 C.2d

trative of the line that has been drawn beyond which a plaintiff
may not go if he hopes thereafter to start again. It is analogous
to the rule that was applicable to nOllsuits before section 581c
was added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1947. A judgment of nonsuit was not on the merits, and a plaintiff could
start anew and recover judgment if he could prove sufficient
facts in the second action. (II erdan Y. Hanson, 182 Cal.
538, 542 [l89 P. 440] ; Estate of Sharon, 179 Cal. 447, 461
1]77 P. 283]; City & County of San P7'ancisco v. Brown, 153
Cal. 644, 648 [96 P. 281].) Section 581e now provides that a
judgment of nonsnit operates as an adjudication upon the
merits unless the conrt otherwise specifies. J n view of the
liheral rnlef; relating to amendments to the pleadings, it has
h(,(,11 forcefully a(h-oeated that the same policy reflected in
section 581c shonld apply to judgments on demurrer, and
that a plaintiff should be required to set forth all the facts
relating to his dispute in one action. (See McFarland, J., diss('nting in Newhall Y. IIatch, 134 Cal. 269, 276 [66 P. 266,
55 L.R.A. 673] ; Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L .
•T. 299, 319-320; Clark on Code Pleading [2d ed.] § 84,
p. 531; 30 Cal.L.Rey. 487, 490-491.) On the other hand less
prejudice is suff('red by a defendant who has had only to
attack the pleadings. than b~; one who has been forced to go
to trial until a nonsuit is granted, and the hardship suffered
by being forced to defend against a new action, instead of
against an amended complaint, is not materially greater. (See
Commerci,(J,l Centre R. Co. v. Superior Court. 7 Cal.2d 121,
]29-130 [59 P.2d 978, 107 A.L.R. 714].) We do not feel,
however. that at this time we should reweigh the conflicting
argnments over the wisdom of the rule we apply. Since it is
a settled rule of procedure upon which parties are entitled
to rely in conducting their litigation, any change therein
should be made by the Legislature and not by this court.
Since the judgment must be reversed, it is unnecessary to
decide whether it was proper in this ease for defendants to
proceed by motion for summar~T judgment under section
437c of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than under the
provisions of section 597 of that code.
The judgment is reyersed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence. J., concurred.
SclJaner. J., ('oncurrcd in the judgment.

